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I. ZYLSTR,,"'S CLAIM ACCRUED NO LATER THAN MARCH 10,2010

Zylstra does not dispute that, on February 26, 2010, he knew he was injured at the
wrestling tournament in which he participated on behalf of BSU. He does not dispute that he
knew, no later than March 10, 20 I 0, he had suffered a concussion that was severe enough to
preclude him from wrestling in the NCAA championships. He accepts that his claim was
untimely if the 180-day notice period began on or before April 26, 2010. The issue before the
Court, therefore, is whether the notice period accrued between February 26, 2010, and April 26,
20 I0. BSU's opening brief demonstrated that under the correct analytical framework, Zylstra's
180-day notice period began on February 26, 2010, when he was injured, and cel1ainly no later
than March 10, 20 I 0, when his treating physician told him he had suffered a concussion and
could no longer wrestle-a diagnosis that he admittedly repeated to several people in the
following weeks. See Response Brief, pp. 5 & 25.
Zylstra concedes that a calise of action generally accrues upon the occurrence of the
wrongful act. See Response Brief, p. 23; see also BHA Invest., Illc. v. City of Boise, 141 Idaho
168,174,108 P.3d 315, 312 (2004). He also agrees that the applicable standard, set forth in
Mal/ory v. City of .Mollfpelier, 126 Idaho 446, 885 P.2d 1162 (el. App. 1994), is that for the

notice period to begin, the plaintiff need not "fully understand the mechanism of the injury and
the government's role," rather, it begins "when he or she is aware of such facts which would
cause a reasonably prudent person to inquire further into the circumstances surrounding tire
illcidem." 126 Idaho at 448 (emphasis added); see also Response Brief, p. 25. This is because

"knowledge of facts which would put a reasonably prudent person on inquiry is the equivalent to
knowledge of the wrongful act and will start the running of the" notice period. McQuillen v. City
of Ammon, 113 Idaho 719, 722, 747 P.2d 741, 744 (1987). Generally, where the wrongful act
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results in immediate physical injury, and the claimant is aware that the government has some
kind of involvement in the occurrence, the notice period begins running immediately. See, e.g.,
Mallory, 126 Idaho 446, 885 P.2d 1162 (Ct. App. 1994), Mitchell v. Binghalll Memorial
Hospital, 130 Idaho 420, 942 P.2d 544 (1997), Newlall v. Stute of Maho, 96 Idaho 711, 535

P.3d 1348 (1975).

°

Although Zylstra does not dispute that his concussion OCCUlTed at the February 26, 20 I

tournament or that he continued to participate in the tournament on behalf of BSU after he was
lIljured, he argues the undisputed

t~lcts

are insuHlcient to start the notice period running until

some dale arter April 26, 20 I 0 for the following reasons:
I. He contends "there is no evidence he had any understanding more than 180 days
before he submitted his claim that he had displayed signs of concussion during his
timeout." Response Brief, p. 21. He contends that Mr. Chorn observed concussion
symptoms during the timeout were "hidden facts" necessary to put him on inquiry
notice of 1m claim. H.esponse Brief, pp. 24-25. He admits his treating physician, on
March 10, 20 I 0, told him he sustained a "significant concussion," but contends "he
was not told at that time that he had shown signs of concussion during the timeout
and therefore had no reason to inquire further." Response Brief, p. 26. In other words,
Zylstra contends that the notice limitations period did not begin to run prior to
April 26, 2010, because he did not know what Mr. Chorn observed during the timeout
or have any reason to believe Mr. Chorn observed concussion symptoms.
2. Zylstra contends that he did not know, prior to April 26, 2010, "that the viable claim
he had against the State related to the injuries he sustained after the initial
concllssion." Response Brief, p. 21. Zylstra concedes the injury waiver he signed
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precluded any claim for the initial concussion (Response Brief, p. 27), but argues that
he did not realize he could sue BSU for being permitted to wrestle in the tournament
after he sustained the concussion. Response Brief, pp. 26-27.
3.

Zylstra argues he cunently has no independent memory of the timeoLlt. Response
Brief, p. 25.

Zylstra's arguments are strikingly similar to those rejected in Mallory, 126 Idaho 446, 885 P.2d
1162 (Ct. App. 1994), Mitchell, 130 Idaho 420, 942 P.2d 544 (1997), and Ralphs v. City of
Spirit Lake, 98 Idaho 225, 560 P.2d 1315 (1977).

In Mal/ory, the Court of Appeals rejected the argument that notice provided 182 days
after injury but 177 days after the plaintiff discovered the "actual cause" was timely. See 126
Idaho at 447. The claim was untimely because the plaintiff, upon being injured, was aware of
sufficient facts to cause a reasonable person to "inquire further into the circumstances
surrounding the incident." It!. at 448. When the plaintitf actually undertook to inquire further
was immaterial, as the issue of accrual did not rest on when the investigation occurred. Rather, it
rested on when the plaintiff had knowledge of facts that would have caused a reasonable person
to

inquire further. See hi. Similarly, when Zylstra learned of Mr. Chorn's observations or that he

may have a viable claim against BSU despite the athletic waiver are immaterial. As BSU argued
in its opening brief, the dispositive issue is whether the undisputed facts establish that Zylstra
knew, prior to April 26,2010, Zylstra was aware of sufficient facts to put a reasonable person on
inquiry notice as a matter of law. BSU submits that the fact he was aware he had suffered a
concussion while wrestling at the PAC-IO toumament as a member of the BSU team establishes
"inquiry notice".
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Moreover, that Zylstra allegedly believed he did not have a viable claim against BSU
until after April 26, 2010, and that he did not know the extent of his injuries until later are
immaterial. In Ralphs, this Court has rejected the argument that the notice period does not begin
until the plaintiff knows the full extent of his or her injuries. See 90 Idaho at 227. In Newlall, this
Court rejected the argument that the notice period does not begin until the plaintiff becomes
aware he has a viable cause of action. See 96 Idaho at 717.
Although BSU's opening brief analyzed Mitchell, and openly relied on it, Zylstra's
response altogether ignores the case. See Appellant's Brief, pp. 11-12. In lv/ifchell, the plaintiff
received a medication overdose during surgery on July 20, 1992. See 130 Idaho at 423. The
hospital told the plaintiff she received the overdose the same day, but explained it was caused by
a machine malfunction. lei. Two months later, the hospital admitted to the plaintiff that a nursing
error caused the overdose. !d. The plaintiff argued the notice period should not begin on the
surgery date because the hospital gave her incorrect information. lei. The district court and the
Idaho Supreme Court disagreed.
Citing to the Mallory standard that "the statute does not begin running when a person
fully understands the mechanism of injury and the government's role, but rather when he or she
is aware of such i11cts that would cause a reasonably prudent person to inquire fUliher into the
circumstances surrounding the incident," the Court held the notice period began on the surgery
date. !d. It reasoned: "The Mitchells were aware of the overdose and respiratory arrest on the
day the overdose occurred. The facts available ... were sufficient to cause a reasonably prudent
person to inquire further." !d. The Court held, "Thus, we hold that the 180-day period began to
run on July 20, 1992, even though the Mitchells did not know the extent of the injury and
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!VIrs. Mitchell's damages or tire exteflt to lvilicll tire ho.\jJital was re!.Jlollsible." [d. at 423-24
(emphasis added).
Zylstra's argument that the 180-day notice period did not begin until he knew that Mr.
Chom observed concussion symptoms during the timeout is the equivalent

to

the rejected

argument in Mitclrell that the notice period did not begin until the plaintiff knew the extent of the
hospital's role in her injury. Zylstra, like the Mitchell plaintit1', knew he was injured on the day
he \vas injured. He knew he continued panicipating in the tou111ament after he was injured. He
knew BSU might be somehow involved in his injury because he participated in the tournament
as a BSU wrestler and had been examined by the team trainer. To the extent his knowledge of
these facts did not put him on inquiry notice on February 26, 2010 because he did not know the
severity of his injury, he was on inquiry notice no later than March 10, 20 I 0 when Dr. Scheffel
diagnosed the concllssion and advised Zylstra he would not provide the medical clearance he
needed to participate in the NCAA tournament.
Mitchell also demonstrates that Zylstra's lack of an independent recollection of the

timeout is immaterial. In Mitc1rell, it was impossible for the plaintiff to have an independent
recollection of the cause of her overdose. She was incapable of evaluating the machine to
detennine whether it malfunctioned. Likewise, there are no repOJ1ed facts suggesting she had
reason to know what buttons the nurse pushed, including whether she pushed the "flush" button,
which would eliminate a machine malfunction as the cause. See 130 Idaho at 421.
Finally, Zylstra'S suggestion that Mr. Chorn's observations were hidden until at least
several months after February 26, 2010, is unsupported by the record. See Response Brief, p. 26.
Mr. Chom documented his February 26, 2010 observations that same day by filling out an
"Injury Evaluation Form." R. Vol. I, p. 340 (19:15-20:10); R. 367. He further documented the
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incident on February 28, 20 I 0, with "Follow-up Notes." R. Vol. I, p. 343 (31 :24-32:32); R. 368.
The Injury Evaluation Form describes Mr. Chorn's observations during the time out and his
assessment of a "possible mild concussion." R. Vol. I, p. 367. The Follow-up Notes contain
entries from February 28, 2010, March 4, 2010, March 9, 2010, March 24, 2010, and April 3 or
8,20 I 0, discussing Mr. Chorn's observations on or around those dates. R. Vol. I, pp. 343 (31 :24)
345 (40: 19) & 368. This documentation believes Zylstra's contention that Mr. Chorn's
observations were hidden or latent facts. They are student records which, like patient medical
records, were available for Zylstra's review.
Zylstra also fails to apply the accrual standard as an objective, reasonableness standard
that does not depend upon the subjective characteristics of a plaintiff. See, e.g. Avila v
Wah/quist, 126 Idaho 745, 748, 890 P.2d 331, 334 (1995). While he concedes the standard

described in Mallory controls, which queries whether a reasonable person "would have inquired
further into the facts," Zylstra persistently argues the notice period did not begin before April
26,2010, because he did not think he had a claim against BSU. He argues "Sam had no reason to
inquire further, as he certainly would not have blamed the university for the only injury he could
have known he had suffered, one that was due solely to the efforts of his wrestling opponent."
Response

Briet~

p. 26. He argues even if he had "truly understood ... that he suffered a

concussion at the tOllmament, he certainly had no way of knowing for months after the
tournament that he likely suffered additional injuries from being allowed to continue to wrestle."
ld. He argues the notice period did not begin prior to April 26, 2010, because he "truly did

discover what was almost certainly the real cause of his [injuries] only when he finally
understood that the trainer's decision to allow him to continue wrestling after observing signs of
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his concussion gave rise to a legal claim for which the liability waivers did not apply." Response
Brief, p. 27.
The undisputed facts establish that Zylstra was aware of facts which would place a
reasonable person on inquiry notice of a potential claim against BSU. Despite his claim of
memory loss, Zylstra was never unable to recall the facts which created the inquiry notice. See
BriefIn SUppOJ1 of Cross-Appeal, pp. 21-23. His claims against BSU accrued on the day he was
injured and, no later than March 10, 2010 when he met with Dr. Scheffel.
II. ZYLSTRA WAS NEVER "INSANE" AS CONTEMPLATED BY I.C. § 5-230

In his response, Zylstra argues he was "insane" and entitled to tolling under I.C. § 5-230
because he "wasn't competent or consciously aware of everything that was happening to him at
that time ... ". See Response Brief, p. 21. He suggests that evidence of a disability or some
general incapacity is sufficient to raise issues of fact as to whether he should be considered
insane. Id., p. 23. He equates an alleged partial loss of memory caused by physical injuries with
a qualifying disability.
The overriding flaw in Zylstra's argument is his failure to offer a legal standard for
determining when a plaintiff is considered insane under the statute. The approach he suggests
treats the question of whether a plaintiff suffers from qualified disability under I.C. § 5-230 as
controlling the date of accrual, without any consideration to inquiry notice. As outlined in § I
above, the question of when a plaintiff could have reasonably discovered their claim determines
when a cause of action accrues. See Independellt Scltool Dist. of Boise City v. Callister, 97
Idaho 59, 62,539 P.2d 987, 990 (1975); Doe v. Durtsclti, 110 Idaho 466,474,716, P.2d 1238,
1246, (1986).

Accrual occurs wben the plaintiff is aware of sufficient facts to put them on

"inquiry notice" of their potential claim. See iYlitcltell v. Bingham Memorial Ho!)p., 130 Idaho
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420,428,942 P.2d 544, 547 (J997); MallOlY vs. City

0/ MOlltpelier,

126 Idaho 446, 448, 885

P.2d 1162,1164 (Ct. App. 1994); RellZo v. Idalto State Dept. a/Agriculture, 149 Idaho 777,
241 P.3d 950 (2010). The question of when a plaintiff should have reasonably discovered the
f~lcts

'which placed them on inquiry notice, is an objective reasonable person standard. The

plaintiff's subjective state of mind is irrelevant to the accmal question. See Avila v. Wahlquist,
126 Idaho at 748. (The hlct the plaintiff was illiterate in the English language and could not read
a letter from an insurance adjuster did not defeat the fact she was on inquiry notice of the
contents of the letter.) The timeline can be tolled if, at the time of accrual, the plaintiff sutTers
from a recognized disability. See

I.e. § 5-230.

In this case, the trial court concluded an Issue of fact existed regarding whether Mr.
Zylstra was insane and entitled to tolling. See Tr., p. 99:22-104:21. What is missing in the trial
court's decision and, the plaintiffs response, is a definition or standard for determining when an
individual is considered "insane" as that term is used in

I.e. § 5-230. Zylstra suggests that once

a plaintiff establishes they suffer from a disability that adversely impacts their everyday
functioning the question of insanity and tolling should always be resolved by the jury. See
Response Brief, pp. 22-23.
The plaintiff's approach would render Rule 56 inapplicable to the tolling issue. In the
absence of a defined legal standard it is unclear how the jury would be instructed regarding a
plaintitTs burden of proof to establish they were insane at the time their claim accrued. A more
appropriate approach would require a clear legal standard that identifies a prima facie case for
tolling. The trial court could then, consistent with the standards goveming Rule 56, determine if
an issue of material fact exists regarding whether an individual plaintiff meets the legal standard.
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In cases where an issue of fact is found

to

exist, the jury would be instructed under the same

legal standard that was utilized by the trial cOUli to deny the motion for summary judgment.
In BSU's opening brief, the Court was provided a legal standard that has been used by
many courts which have been asked to address this issue. Tolling is recognized '''when the
disability is of such a nature to show him [or her] unable to manage his [or her] business affairs
or estate, or to comprehend his [or her] legal rights or liabilities' 52 Am. 1ur. 2d Limitation of
Actions § 187 (1970)." See O'Neal v. Division

0/ Family Services, State 0/ Utah, 821 P.2d

[139,1142, (Utah 1991). See also lVlcCarthy v. Volkswagen o/America, Ille., 55 N.Y. 2d 543,
548,450 N.Y.S. 2d 457,453 N.E. 2d 1072 (1982).
In Travis v. Ziter, 681 So. 2d 1348 (Ala. 1996) the court was asked to address the
meaning of the term insanity as Llsed in that state's tolling statute. The Alabama legislature had
not provided a definition for the term "insane". See 681 So. 2d at 1352. Summarizing the
plaintiff's argument, the Court wrote:
The essence of the Travis's argument is that plaintiffs should be
able to use the tolling provision in any situation where they can
demonstrate an inability to comprehend a specific legal right, or to
recall events that happened many years before, notwithstanding the
t~ICt that they have been capable of living an independent, normal,
and productive life as to all other matters. Such an expansive
interpretation would undermine the purpose of the statute of
limitations.
See 681 So. 2d at 1355. The plaintiff's argument was rejected with the Court ruling the term
insanity, as interpreted by its earlier decision in Alabama Power Co. v. Shaw, 1111 So. 17 (Ala.
1927) "encompasses temporary and soundness of the mind and recognized that the word
'signifies any derangement of the mind that deprives it of the power to reason or will
intelligemly.'" See 681 So. 2d at 1352. The court rejected the suggestion its earlier decision in
Shaw was "intended to bring within the protection of the insanity tolling provision those persons
REPL Y BRIEF RE CROSS APPEAL - 9

claiming to suffer from a mental illness that affects only an understanding of a particular legal
right.

/d. at 1355.

Because the plaintiff had not sutfered ti-om a mental condition that

prevented him from managing his day-to-day affairs or protecting his legal rights, the statute of
1imitations was not tolled. Id.
Using a similar approach, the Court in Feeley v. SOllthern Pacific Transportatioll Co.,
234 Cal App 3d 949, 285 Cal Rptr. 666 (J 991) concluded a plaintiff was insane during tbe time
was rendered unconscious by the injuries he alleged were caused by the defendant's
negligence. The Court wrote:
Though the precise issue before us appears to be a novelty in
California, the principles which apply are not. A finding that a
person was "incapable for caring for his [or her] property or
transacting business or understanding the nature or effects of his
[or her] acts, [is] equivalent to a finding in expressed terms that [he
or she] was insane within the meaning of tbe statute of
limitations."

See 285 Cal. Rptr. at 667. The Court concluded:
It appears obvious that a coma caused by physical trauma is a

mental condition which renders the plaintiff "incapable of caring
for his [or her] property or transacting business or understanding
the nature or effects of his [or her] acts" so long as the comatose
condition exists, (Pearl, supra, 77 Cal at p. 307, 177 P.845), and
logically should be included within the judicially developed
definition of insanity as used in section 352.

See 285 CaL Rptr. at 667.
The common theme in these cases is the proposition that where tolling is allowed by
::;tatute, the terms insane, incompetent, or non compos mentis, are interpreted in a manner which
looks to the plaintifT's overall ability to care for themselves, attend to personal affairs, and
function in society. See Brumfield v. LOIve, 744 So. 2d 383, 387 (Miss [999) (Describing the
test for "mentally incompetent" as whether the plaintiffs mind was so unsound "he cannot
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manage the ordinary affairs of life."); McCarthy v. Volkswagen of America, 55 N.Y. 2d 543,
548 (1982) ("legislature meant to extend the tolling Cor sanity to only those individuals who are
to

protect their legal rights because of an overall inability to function in society.");

Walker v. Brallnan, 243 Ga. App 235, 236-237, 533 S.E. 2d 129, 130 (2000) ("Mental
incapacity is not whether one has merely mismanaged his affairs, or was merely unclear in his
mind or not bright." Rather "[tJhe test is one of capacity -- whether the individual, being of
unsound mind, could not manage the ordinary affairs of his life"); Hoc/zhalllll v. Casia/lo, 292
III. App. 3d 589, 686 NE2d 626, 631 (1997). ("In a personal injury case, a person is not legally
disabled

if~

he or she can comprehend the nature of the injury and its implications.")

In this case, Mr. Zylstra's actions following his February 26, 2010 injury are not
consistent with the standard for insanity which has been developed by courts throughout the
country. The fact he was exhibiting symptoms consistent with the concussion he suffered during
the PAC-IO Tournament does not lead to the conclusion that he was unable to attend to his
personal affairs or, comprehend legal rights or responsibilities. Zylstra does not dispute that he
was able to live independently, attend classes at BSU, manage his personal affairs, get married,
and consider and pursue a career in professional wrestling with the WWE. Additionally, during
the 180 timeline, it is undisputed Mr. Zylstra met with and discussed the possibility of litigation
against BSU with an attorney. He freely admits that when he met with Mr. Oolifka, he suggested
that any claim against the university would be ban-ed by the liability of waiver he had signed as a
member of the wrestling team. See R., p. 506, 220 (Zylstra deposition, pp. 235:5-236:7). See
also Response brief, pp. 27-28.

As recognized by Dr. Beaver, this is the type of cognitive

f'ullctiol1lng which is inconsistent with the argument that Zylstra was insane at the time of his
injury or, in the 1110nths thereafter. See R., pp. 433-435.
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Whether the discussions with the attorney occurred in April or early May is irrelevant.
The important undisputed fact is that during the 180 day timeline, Mr. Zylstra was capable of
understanding his legal rights which is evidenced by his admitted ability to discuss the merits of
a claim with his roommate as well as an attorney and, relate to the attorney, possible legal and
nlctual impediments to a lawsuit against BSU. If one assumes his claim accrued on the day he
met with Dr. Scheffel (March 10, 20 I0) the deadline for filing his notice of tort claim expired
September 6, 20 IO. In other words, after speaking with an attorney and discussing the validity of
a written liability waiver, Zylstra waited five months to file a notice of claim. He was, at the
time his claim accrued and, thereafter, capable of understanding and protecting his legal rights.
For that reason, he was not insane. The 180 day timeline to file a notice of claim was not tolled
and his notice of claim is untimely.
III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons outlined above, the district court's ruling denying BSU's motion for
summary judgment should be reversed due to Mr. Zylstra'S failure to file a timely notice of tort
claim with the Secretary of State.
RESPECTFULL Y SUBMITTED this:;,::l.

day of March, 2014.

ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP

BY~~.~
Phillip J. Collaer, Of the Firm
Attorneys for DefendantsiRespondents
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